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Stephen L. Elkin introduced the concept of "urban regime. " In brief, Elkin's
conceptualization tied together land use interests , city politicians, and functional bureaucracies in
a theory of urban politics. Elkin argued that over time , land use interests in a city wou ld seek
policy outcomes which woul d further urban development and reduce pub lic disputes. Thus, the
land use interests sought stab le alliances with city politicians. In turn , city politicians looked for
the steady allegiance of blocks of voters . The bureaucracies, which delivered the city serv ices ,
responded to the land use alliance on issues deemed essential for promoting the economic position
of the city (Elkin, 1985 used the example of the distribution of police serv ices). The essence of
the reg ime idea is that dominant coalitions, over periods of time , decide policy and provide a
vision for the city .
The regime concept has been used by several scholars of urban politics. Todd Swanstrom
argues that regime theory can integrate the insights of urban economics with the insights of urban
po litics. Swanstrom believes that "a theory of urban regimes can capture the variety of urban
po litics wh ile still achiev ing a useful level of generalization " (1988 :107-108) . Swanstrom
(1988:108) proposes that we focus on "the tension between economic and political logic in the
formation of state policy. "

For Swans trom , the type of regime developed in a city will be

determined by economic pressures, capital accumulation , and class composition. In addition,
polit ical leadership and its values will influence the nature of the regi me.
The essays in Stone and Sanders (1987) operate from a regime paradigm. In
summarizing the themes of these papers , Stone observes that "politics matters .. .. that politics is
1
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shaped profoundly by the inter relationship between state and market. ..and that we need
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appropriate and realistic criter ia to ju dge policies and political practices (Stone and Sanders ,
II
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1987: 17-18). Subseq uently Stone , focusing on who is guiding development policy and to what
effect, presents a typology of regime types (Stone and Sanders , 1987:272-273). The first type,
the corporate regime, is one in which private interests --Iarge downtown businesses--p lay a major
role in guiding develop ment policy with the effect that public authority and resources are used to
subsidize investment. Elkin's (1987:25-5 1) description of Dallas provides one example. It is
suggested that Atlanta (Reed , 1987), Baltimore (Stoker, 1987), and New York (Shefter , 1985;
Pecorella, 1987; Do ig, 1987; and Savitch, 1988) also follow the corporate reg ime pattern .
The second type , the progressive regime , is less familiar to us in the United States. In a
progressive regime, middle- and lower-cl ass neighbo rhood groups playa major role in policymaking. When dominant, a progressive regime will expand services , pursue redistributive
policies, and, perhaps , limit growth and place controls on land developers. Body-Gendrot's
description of Paris ' 13th arrondissement is one example (see Stone and Sanders, 1987:125- 143).
In his Prog ress ive Cities, Pierre Clavel gives American examples: Hartford, Berkeley, Burlington
and Santa Monica. Cities such as Boston and San Francisco have also been progressive on
occasion. Examples from outside the United States are more common. We think of such
pro gressive British local governments as Liverpool (Park inson, et aI., 1988) and Sheffield (Baker
and Carlson, 1987) , and the Dore administration in Montreal , Canada (Leonard and Leveillee,
1986).
Finally, Stone presents a third type: the caretaker regime. In a caretaker regime , small
businesses and homeowners constra in city governments in policy-making. When dominant,
caretaker regimes will rely on the market and do as little as possible, while minimizing taxes ,
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governm ent expenditures, and government activity. Sanders' (1987) case study of Kalamazoo,
Michigan, is a classic example of a caretaker regime. As we shall see below, New Orleans also
exemplified a caretaker regime for many years.
First it should be noted that no city will precisely fit a particular category . Most cities
evidence characteristics of more than one type but appear to be predominantly characterized by a
part icular regime. Second, one must always bear in mind that typologies , such as the urban
regime scheme, do not ensure good theory , rather that good theory allows one to construct
accurate and insightful typologies. Such typologies allow us to communicate and/or distill
complex situations into theoretical shorthand. We find it easier to manipulate these concepts and
their relationships. Thus we can conceptually isolate the necessary relationships and alter the
contingent ones in order to reth ink the implications of alternative empirical conjunctures. This
theoretical manipulation is best done in tandem with empirical evaluat ion in a recursive fashion.
This is the exercise of this paper.
Recently urban reg ime theory in particular and the "new urban politics" in general have
come under attack for being theoretically undeveloped (Cox, 1991a, 1991b, also see Stone, 1991
and Fainstein, 1991 for their rejoinders). Basically, Cox is transfe rring debates in geography
(see Antipode and Society and Space concern ing epistemology and methodology in what has been
called the new "locality studies") to the new urban politics literature. I Cox's most telling point is
that descriptive concepts must be developed rationally and interpreted and, if necessary,
respecified using higher-l evel abstractions. Cox claims that "new urban politics" concepts (e.g.,
the growth coalition, growth machine, and urban regime) have not been critically examined in
light of the higher-level abstractions of his choice, the state and the structure of capital. 2 It is our
reading of this literatu re that these concepts from the "new urban politics" are concrete
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representations at the local scale of the higher-level abstraction "the state," paying particular
attention to the changing structure of capital (e.g. , see Swanstrom, 1985 and Logan and Molotch,
1987). More clearly stated , we feel that Cox's point is that he does not agree with the
specification of these concepts in the literature he cites.
In many instances we share Cox 's unease. Rather than attempt to respecify these
concepts by reviewing other scholars' research with all the caveats that would create, it is the
purpo se of this paper to describe and analyze the nature of the New Orleans urban regime
focusing on the first term of Sidney Barthelemy, the second black mayor of New Or leans (1986
1990). First, we believe that regime theory has been unspecified particularly in relation to racial
politics. Thus we begin by discussing the changing relationship of blacks to the prevailing New
Orleans regime. Second , since we agree with Cox (1991a) that Stone ' s regime typology is
undertheorized in terms of the structure of capital and the role of the state in its interpretatio n of
growth coalitions, we will pay particular attention to the role of the "consensus seeking para
apparatus " (see Clark and Dear , 1984) in policy development. Finally, we feel that the
relationship between the structure of the electoral coalition and the stability of the governing
regime has been undertheorized in urban regime theory . In the concluding section, we
summarize our version of a theoretically reconstructed urban regime theory.

Blacks an d th e New Orlean s Regime

Blacks in New Orleans have played a role in electoral politics for over a century. As
early as the turn of the century, blacks (mainly Creoles of color) had some influence in local
elections.

That influence was weakened by the passage of Jim Crow laws in the 1920s. In the
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1940s, a time of deep divisions within the white power structure and hotly contested elections,
blacks were successful in gaining some access to the political system. Yet, as in the rest of the
South , significant electoral participation by blacks did not occur until the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. By the late 1960s, blacks were an influential element within the electoral
coalition, and as such, created the opportunity for change within the urban regime.
Even so, politics within the black community continued to reflect the historical and
cultural distinction between the major groups: those of an Anglicized heritage and those of a
French heritage (who later became known as Creo les of color) . Since antebellum days, the
Creoles of color represented a large, articulate and often well-to-do free black population .
Duri ng the period of Federal occupation and Reconstruction, the black Creoles were able to
secure their political and civil rights . Many local leaders of the Civil Rights Movement of the
1950s and 1960s were Creoles who sought to regain the rights they had won, and lost, 75 years
earlier. The divisions within the black community have weakened their power vis-a-vis the
governing coalition.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had an immediate impact on the black political landscape
in two ways: First was an increase in black electorate, from 17.5 percent in 1964 to 25.2
percent in 1966; and second, the creation of black political organizations. These organizations
served to institutionalize and strengthen the black vote. The two major organ izations formed at
this time were the Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL), a political offshoo t of
the national Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Community Organizat ion for Urban
Politics (COUP), a more conservative group formed in the black Creo le stronghold of the 7th
Ward. These groups served as intermediaries to broker the black vote and became convenient
channels for white politicians to gain access to blacks (Hirsch , 1992a: 57).
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In 1969 the major black organizations endorsed councilman-at-large Maurice "Moon"
Landrieu for mayor. His opponent in the runoff, Jimmy Fitzmorris, refused to appeal to black
voters. Landrieu won with 90 percent of the black vote and a minority of white votes; black
turnout was 75 percent. Landrieu's success in garnering the black vote ensured that black
political organ izations would be viewed as major players whose influence would be felt in the
highest levels of local gove rnment.
Landrieu was well-known to blacks long before he ran for mayor . As a fresh man state
legislator in 1960-6 1, he opposed (virtually alone) the segregationists at every tum during the
school integration crisis. As leader in the City Council (1965-69) , he responded to black needs .
Once in power Landrieu used the political process to open up opportunities for blacks.
He increased the number of blacks in civil service jobs from 19.4 percent in 1970 when Landrieu
took office to 43 percent in 1978 when he left office (Hirsch , 1992a:61-68). He named the city's
first black Chief Administrative Officer (Terrence Duvernay). And he appointed several blacks as
department heads, including Sidney Barthelemy to the Welfare Department. 3 Landrieu also was
successful at providi ng significant patronage to blacks.
As Hirsch has suggested, "Landrieu was able to offer new opportunities to blacks without
grievously antagonizing whites because he was cutting large new slices off an expanding
economic pie" (Hirsch , 1992a:74). The pie expanded because of Landrieu's abilities to bring
significant federal reve nues into the city. In order to do this, Landrieu had first to convince the
city's elite that it was appropriate to receive federal dollars: that federal aid was no longer to be
seen as an intrusion by the federa l government into local affairs.

Much of this aid was

antipoverty funds that he funneled through predominantly black channels, especially Total
Commun ity Action (TCA). State funds were also forthcomi ng follow ing Edwin Edwards'
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election as governor in 1971, with the help of black voters. Especially important for the
patronage that could be dispensed was the development of the Louisiana Superdome , a state
facility , which opened in New Orleans in 1975. The publicly financed Superdome was the
catalyst for the multibillion dollar pr ivate investment that transformed the central business district
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. It was in the ear ly 1970s that a significant influx of
outside capital began to penetrate New Orleans . Growth was so strong under Landrieu' s
administrat ion that a Growth Management Prog ram for the downtown area was developed and
instituted (see Brooks and Young, 1981).
In 1977 a black Creo le, Ernest "Dutch" Moria l, a State Appeals Court Judge, was elected
mayor. Morial won by only 5,471 votes ; he garnered 97 percent of the black vote and 19
percent of the white vote (mostly affluent Uptowners) , but not the support of most of the
established black leadership (Hirsch, 1992a:83-85). Most of the black political organizations saw
Morial as a spoiler who did not condone political patronage. Therefore they threw their lot in
with liberal white candidates who might be more forthcoming with patronage. Morial defeated
the liberal whites during the primaries and then went on to the runo ff and defeated Joseph
DiRosa, a conserv ative, white city councilman.
In a major speech just prior to his inauguration, Morial called for a revision of public
pr iorities, a retooling of public-private part nerships that would enlist pr ivate resources for public
ends, and a reinvigorated, power ful ro le for the mayor (whom , he said, had a citywide mandate
to assert the public interest). He promi sed to bring new personnel into city government on the
basis of "intellect and pub lic dedication regardless of race, creed or national or igin ... [I] have no
intention of politicizing the incoming administrat ion on narrow gro unds of reverse discrimination"
(Perry and Stokes, 1987:2 29) .
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Morial's early appointments reflected his emphasis on merit, not obligation. For
example, some of his mid-level appointments were recent graduates of Harvard ' s Kennedy School
of Government, where he was a fellow before his inauguration. Morial tried to curtail patronage
and thus most of the established black political organizations lost access to the kind of patronage
they had enjoyed during the Landr ieu years. Morial also tried to crack the entrenched bastions of
white privilege and power by demanding free and open access to the public's business across-the
board .
Morial's assertion of a primary role for the office of mayor (in the past the mayor was
not considered one of the influentials in the city) brought him into conflict with the city's social
and economic oligarchy. Since the turn of the century , members of the oligarchy had ruled from
their positions on the many nonelected boards and commissions which govern major areas like
the port, the lakefront, sewerage and water, and the city debt. In 1979 Morial took on the Board
of Liquidation, City Debt, which was self-perpetuating, by encouraging a lawsuit to end the
board's "racially restr ictive membership. " The judge ruled against the board, nullified its last
two appointments, and ordered the board to make a good-faith effort in considering a non-white
(Hirsch, 1992b: 19). By the time Mori al left office, most of the major board s and commissions
had at least one black member. Throughout his term in office Morial br istled at the
independence of the boards and commissions while he urged them to work in tandem with the
city administration to improve the area 's economy.
A major emphasis of the Moria l administration was enhancing the economic development
of the city. Morial continued the Landr ieu success in attracting large amounts of federa l funds to
the city. He created a new Office of Federal Programs and Special Projects to creatively use
federal funds to tackle major urban prob lems, and established the city's first professionally
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staffed Office of Economic Develop ment to develop and implement an economic development
strategy for the city as a whole. Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) were used to
augment downtown development as well as neighborhood revitalization (Young 1984). While he
continued to support the large-scale tourism begun under the Landrieu administration, Morial also
tried to diversify the economy by creating the infrastructure for a manufacturing base through the
development of the Almonaster-Michoud Industrial District. As Morial said, "we can ill
afford...to alone remain the hotel-keepers and waiters for well-heeled tourists" (as quoted in
Hirsch 1992b:29).
Morial tr ied to encourage the city to pay its own way , realizing that the federal and state
aid on which the city depended was rapidly drying up. He introduced a number of local revenue
measures in an attempt to resolve the growing fiscal crisis. However, none of the more
progressive measures passed . The drop in federal and state funds was dramatic. In 1978, 57
perce nt of the city's annual operating budget came from federal and state funds; by 1982 , only 30
percent were from those sources. During Morial's term in office , city emp loyment dropped by
one-third . Morial said that his greatest disappointment in office was his failure to come up with
an adequate revenue base.
Morial's 1982 re-election campaign was a very bitter one which centered around what
was termed his "arrogant personality ." Many in the black community thought Morial was called
"arrogant" by the white elite simply because he sought to assert the rig hts of blacks in the socio
political life of the community. Thus blacks voted for Mor ial in droves . He was re-elected in
1982 with 99 percent of the black vote (and the endorsement of most black political
organi zations) and 14 percent of the white vote. After his re-election, Morial found himself
besieged by the "Gang of Five" on the City Council , which had the power to blunt his initiatives
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and override his vetoes. This anti-Morial coalition included COUP's Barthelemy and Lambert
Boissiere, as well as three whites: Bryan Wagner , Michael Early and Wayne Babovich." In an
attempt to rega in greater contro l and lose his lame duck status, Moria l twice tried unsuccessfully
to change the City Charter's limitation to two successive four-year terms as mayor.
In sum, Morial's impact on blacks included increasing the number of blacks on the
municipal workforce (from 40 percent in 1977 to 53 percent in 1985); appointing more blacks as
heads of city departments, including the first black chief administrative officer and the first black
police chief; and issuing two executive orders that mandated the perce nt of minority labor force
participation in all city financed/administered projects and specified a goal for minority
subcontracting participation (see Perry and Stokes, 1987).5 Morial's biggest impact, however,
was in having a black person occupying the mayor's office: it was a source of pr ide for blacks,
and an opportunity for whites to come to grips with the changing political landscape.

Barthelemy's Term in Office (1986-90)

With Mor ial unable to run for a third term of office, the 1985-86 mayora l campaign
pitted two major black candidates against each other: City Councilman-at-Iarge Sidney
Barthelemy and State Senator William Jefferson (Feeney and Katz, 1985). Of Creo le heritage,
Barthelemy grew up in the heart of the Creole 7th Ward. He began his caree r in public service
as head of the city We lfare Department during Moon Landrieu's administration. With the
support of COU P, in 1974 he became the first black state senator since Reconstruction. He
became the city' s first black councilman-at-Iarge in 1978 and was re-elected in 1982. While on
the council, he waged a continual battle with Mor ia!. Some suggest that Barthe lemy, unhappy
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that Morial had beat him in becoming the city' s first black mayor , did his best to make life
difficult for Mo rial as mayor. Barthelemy entered the campaign as the front-runner.
Jefferson had a decidedly non-Creole backgro und, having grown up in north east
Louisiana in a poor , rural family. In 1976 he became the founding partner in what is still the
city's most successful black law firm. In 1979 he was elected to the state Senate from uptown
New Orleans, defeating a 16-year , wh ite incumbent. While he and his law partners suppo rted
Morial in his 1977 mayoral campaign, in the 1982 campaign Jefferson ran against Morial and
received only 7 percent of the votes , mostly from affluent whites Uptown .6 Shortly after the
election, Jefferson and Morial reached a detente and shared a "peaceful co-existence."
In the 1986 mayoral campaign Morial backed Jefferson in what he viewed as his best
chance to beat Barthel emy. Morial's support helped Jefferson to run first in the primary among a
field of three major candidates (the other candidate was Sam LeBlanc, a white attorney and
former state representative, who ran as a "white hope " candidate) . In the runoff, however ,
Jefferson lost to Barthelemy , 42 percent (67,698 votes) to 58 percent (93,049). Jefferson won in
the predominantly black wards, but Barthele my took the majority white wards and predominantly
white wards (Time Picayune, March 2, 1986, p. 1). Thus Barthe lemy won the election because
he had the overwhel ming major ity of the white vote (85 percent) and a significant minor ity of the
black vote (30 percent). Whites, who turned out to vote in slightly larger numbers than blacks,
cast the pivotal votes in Barthelemy 's election . In Barthelemy , white New Orle ans had found
itself a black mayor it could live with. The white vote for Barthelemy was also seen as a vote
against Morial and what was viewed as his arrogance . Morial's endorsement of Jefferson helped
him in the black community but probably cost him some white votes ."
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The issues in the campaign seemed to center more around style than substance.
Barthelemy' s campaign theme was unity and harmony as he pledged "to bring this divided city
together , " to get people of all races and socio-economic backgrounds to work together to improve
New Orleans. In his inaugura l address Barthelemy promised to "unite with the Chamber of
Commerce, the Business Council of New Orleans, with the World Trade Center , with the City
Council, and with others to expand the commercial and industrial base of this region. ...It is only
by wor king together that we will attain our maximum potential" (Times Picayune, May 6, 1986,
p. A8). Conspicuously missing from his address was any hint of a pr imary role for the office of
the mayor in forging this new vision for the city.
Barthelemy' s biggest challenges upon taking office were the slump in the economy and
the fiscal crisis. The February 1986 figures showed unemployment in the New Orleans area was
11. 1 percent (Times-Picayune, May 4, 1986, p. 1). The deficit was $30 million, which
threatened to cripple the city. With the city council's cooperation , the Barthelemy administration
developed a plan that slowly chipped away at and finally eliminated the deficit (by cutting costs,
raising fees, privatizing some operations and gaining cooperation from private group s and some
boards and commissions; but in the process 1,200 city workers were laid off).

During his first

term he was unable to create a permanent revenue base for the city, and his major revenue
gener ators -- a lottery and European-style casino for New Orleans -- were not endorsed by the
business community or passed by the legislature. His relationship with pro-reform Governor
Buddy Roemer was rocky at best as Barthelemy sought to stabilize state funding to the city.
Barthe lemy has said that he is less concerned with raising taxes than he is in creating new jobs.
To that end he spent a great deal of effort during his first term trying to attract investors and
foster better relations with local business leaders .
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The mayor continued to stress the importance of tour ism to the city. He is credited with
playing a key role in luring the 1988 Republican National Convention to the city, getting voters
to approve a millage increase for a $40 million aquar ium and riverfront park (see below) , and
getting the funds and land necessary for expansion of the New Orleans Convention Center. He
also shepherded through plans for a $40 million reta il distribution center in eastern New Orleans
(furthering former Mayor Moria l's vision of the Almonaster-Michoud Industrial Park). On the
other hand, the Barthelemy administration has witnessed a number of economic setbacks: the
relocation of about 80 percent of the Amoco Production Company's New Orleans office to
Houston, resulting in a loss of 850 jobs in the city; the loss of the space shuttle contr act to
Huntsville; and the closing of a 140-year-old retail establishment on the major retail thoroughfare
downtown .
While the mayor is not blamed for these setbacks as such, he has been criticized for not
articulating a coherent vision for where he wants to take the city in the 1990s. Other gro ups not
contro lled by City Hall, both public and pr ivate, have been left to chart the city's course (see
below) . At the same time , these groups have sought and received pub lic resources to further
their visions. The administration has continued to operate in a crisis mode, assembling plans as
issues arise , instead of anticipating prob lems and working potential solutions into an overall
strategy.
Barthelemy has been quite successful, however , in the traditional political job of
distributing patron age. Among the dominant black political groups, he has strengthened the
fortu nes of his organization, COUP, and maintained good relations with the SOUL group. He
quickly moved to take control of patronage-rich city agencies, like the Housing Authority of New
Orlean s (HANO), the Regional Transit Authority (a law recently passed now enables the mayor
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to name five of the eight RTA commissioners), the New Orleans Exh ibition Hall Authority
(NOEHA), and the Aviation Board."

Relations with the Sewerag e and Water Board (S & WB)

have been relatively smooth , so much so that the S & WB agreed in 1988 to collect an $8 service
charge for the city .
Barthelemy has score d points in other narro wly political areas, too. He has had some
success with the city's unions, playing a role in reso lving a dockwo rker's strike in 1986 and a
threatened walkout by RTA bus dri vers in 1987 (both groups having largely black membership).
He has also kept member s of the police and fire departments from actualizing their many threats
of a job action. He increased his popularity among black voters ear ly in his administration when
he ordered city work crews out on a Saturday morning in February 1987 to remove barric ades
erected by the Jeffe rson Parish Sheriff s Office which blocked access for a predominantly black
neighborhood in New Orleans into an adjoining predominantly white Jefferson Parish
neighborhood. Many in the black neighborhoods said racism was behind the barricades , which
Jefferson officials said were meant to deter crime. Barthelemy has been credited with winning
approval for the aquari um millage (see below) and a tax increase for the public libraries.
However , during his first term he was not able to get voters to approve a $195 property serv ice
charge , a 12 mill property tax increase for police, fire and ambulance serv ices, or the Governor 's
fiscal reform package (see below) .
Although he has been successful in a number of areas , charges of ineptitude still follow
him. Business leaders have complained that the mayor ' s office is not forceful enough in solving
the city's major problems , especially the fiscal crisis. In response to the perceived need for more
dynam ic leadership, several new groups have formed and become major actors in the economic
development life of the city. Barthelemy's style of leadership has facilitated the appearance of
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these groups, groups which have encouraged the fashioning of a regime that is more corporate in
its approach.

Consensus Seeking Para-ap paratuses and the Urban Regime

For years New Orleans was known as one of the last cities in the United States where an
old, long-established social aristocracy still controlled politics and business. Under Landrieu and
Mori al, that aristocracy's hold on politics was lessened, as new political actors came to the scene.
Partic ipation by blacks in the electoral arena helped make the new politics possible. Morial tried
to forge a part nership between the public and private sectors , with the Office of the Mayor
playing a major role in developing the vision of where that partnership was to take the city (see
Economic Development Strategy, 1978). During the Barthelemy years the old aristocr acy is
losing its grip on the business world , as recent corporate newcomers to the community carve
significant econo mic and social niches for themselves. In the process of becoming the new
leaders (consensus seekers), these members of the pr ivate sector are beginning to articulate a
vision for the city. It is a vision that has little input from the public sector , especially City Hall.
When he was first elected mayor , Barthelemy said he felt it was important for the private sector
to take the lead in creating the economic development initiatives for the city, and that happened
during his first term.

The Business Council and the New Corporate Leadership
The group which has played a key role in taking the initiative and fashioning a vision for
the city is the Business Council, a coalition of corporate leaders which formed in late 1985. The
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group' s vaguely stated mission is to boost economic development of the region by working to
reform state and local fiscal policies, improve education and otherwise enhance the quality of
local life. The gro up's first major project was to provide City Hall with $250,000 in order to
save the city from having to close its libraries in the face of a fiscal shortfall in 1986 (Times
Picayune, April 7, 1986, p. 1). The money enabled the city to keep six of its branch libraries
open for six months. During that time the Business Council worked with the mayor to get voters
to approve a millage increase which allowed all the libraries to reopen .
Late in 1986 the Business Counci l spun off a new organization, the Council for Fiscal
Reform , which set its task as revamping Louisiana's antiquated and inefficient budget and tax
systems. The council made presentations around the state, trying to convince citizens and the
legislature alike that Louisiana had to broaden its tax base (by shifting some of the tax burden
from business to consumers/individuals) and revise its spending habits , or else the state would go
bankrupt. During the gubernatorial campaign of 1987, Buddy Roemer endorsed the council' s
fiscal plan and, after being elected governor, convinced the legislature to put a modified version
of the plan before the voters. The package was defeated on April 29, 1989, by voters who
brid led at the prospects of higher taxes. The final count showed 548,297, or 55 percent, of the
voters opposed, and 448,363 voters in support of the proposal, which was on the ballot in the
form of a constitutional amendment (Times-Picayune, Apr il 30, 1989, p. 1).
Roemer's tax-restructur ing plan failed because it did not win the support of blacks and
blue-collar whites -- the groups the governor said would benefit the most, from lower taxes and
increased jobs. In New Orleans the plan won by a mere 150 votes: 53,085 (50 perce nt) to

52,9 35. The plan lost narrowly among black voters in New Orleans, many of whom did not vote
at all, despite the support of Mayor Sidney Barthelemy and former Mayor Dutch Morial. Black
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proponents of the plan argued that the plan would benefit the black poor through lower sales
taxes, and in the large number of jobs that would be created from the infrastructure projects to be
funded by the program. The plan was opposed by State Senator William Jefferson, who said it
would provide few jobs , lead to larger state deficits, and mostly benefit a handful of the state's
largest corporations (Times Picayune, April 6, 1989 , p. 8).
The defeat of Fiscal Reform in 1989 did not deter the Business Council fro m remaining
involved in the affairs of New Or leans. After the defeat, however , the Business Council had a
greater appreciation of the need to get public support for their plans . In the fall of 1988 the
council announced its intention to create a "master economic action" plan to revitalize the New
Orleans economy (Finn , 1988). The council said it was up to the business community to draw
the political, professional and economic leaders together to agree on an action-based plan. The
plan would build on New Orleans ' strengths: tour ism, the port, medical centers and the
fractured-but-still-sizable remnants of the oil and gas industry . The gro up did not envision
gathering large-scale public input. Rather , as the plan developed , the group would bounce
proposals off leaders from various segments of the community.
After the defeat of Fiscal Reform , the Business Council decided to include leaders from a
broad segment of the community in creating the plan now called Metrovision. Citizen focus
groups were now added as part of the planning process , and a conscious effort was made to
recruit widely for representatives from various groups , including groups repres enting the black
community. Input from these groups was encouraged . A media component was also added.
These two new areas of focus (citizen input and media) can be seen as an attempt by the Business
Council to educate the public about the economic development needs of the community. The
effort paid off, for in the fall of 1990, a portion of the Fiscal Reform package (the infrast ructure
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improvements program) went before the electorate and passed handily in the state and in New
Orleans. Metrovision had not only served to articulate a plan for the develo pment of the area but
had also served to foster a consensus on a major element of the Business Council' s long-range
plans.
Business Council leader ship has come from corporate newcomers to the city. The first
head of the Business Council was James "Jim Bob " Moffett, chairman and CEO of Freeport
McMoran (a diversified exp lor ation and production compan y), who had impressed the local
business community by moving his Fortune 500 company from its New York headquarters to
New Orleans (Times-Picayune, May 18, 1989 , p. D l). His brand of "Texas-style civic
evangelism " took the city by stor m as he campaigned rele ntlessly for fiscal reform, as well as the
other program s of the council.
With the Business Council at the helm, it has become obvious that there is an emerging
busines s leadership in the city. In many of the recent projects the mayor 's role has been that of a
spokesman for the city (e.g ., attracting the Republican National Convention), while the planning
has come from the pri vate sector. Yet there has been little discussion in the city about the
declining ro le of government. As government is urged to become more like a business, there is
little being said about the fact that business and government have different functions to per form.
The changing relati onship between the public and private sectors during the Barthelemy
administration can perhaps best be seen through a discussion of the Audubon Park Commission's
aquar ium project, to wh ich we now turn.
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The Audubon Park Commission and the Aquarium
During Morial's administration there was an attempt to strip the mayor of his authority
over the Audubon Park Commission (APC), which governe d the Uptown park, the zoo and, at
the time, the whites-only golf club (Hirsch, 1992b:39-42) . The APC's 24 appointees were
named by the mayor with City Council approval. In 1982, the Friends of the Zoo (a pr ivate
corporation) and their allies on the APC sought state legislation to regionalize membersh ip of the
APC and give control of the park and zoo to the state, with members appointed by the governor.
The state passed reorganization legislation in 1982 and again in 1983, but Morial challenged the
legislation in court successfully. Speaking of the proposed state takeover, Sal Anselmo, Morial' s
city attorney, said "... [It] is an effort to keep blacks from getting any contro l of the Zoo
Commission" (Hirsch, 1992b:42). The APC also began to push for zoo and park employees to
be taken out of civil service.
Under the Barthelemy administration, relations between the APC and the mayor's office
have been very smooth. Many of the APC's leaders were also Barthelemy backers in the 1986
mayoral campaign. Some of APC's ear lier goals are being realized, including privatization of
some aspects of the APC and the exemption of zoo and park employees from civil service. The
impetus for both of these changes was the riverfront aquarium in downtown New Orleans,
developed by the APC and fully backed by Barthelemy. The aquar ium opened in 1990.
Barthelemy has called the aquarium project the centerpiece of his economic development
plan, a plan that stresses the pr imacy of tourism. According to the mayor's office, the aquarium
project is expected to do for the downtown riverfront what the Superdome did for the Poydras
Street area in the 1970s, when it served as a catalyst for $3 billion of new construction
downtown . Stressi ng increased tourism, jo bs and economic vitality, the backers of the project -
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the Audubon Park Comm ission -- pulled together a rare consensus of community support. That
support included the entire City Council, the Business Council and the Chamber of Commerce,
the NAACP and Urban League , the tour ism industry and riverfront developers . The small
amount of opposition that surfaced had to do with the site of the project -- along the riverfront on
the edge of the French Quarter , rather than with the project itself. Preservationists were against
the site because they felt its scale would harm the character of the Quarter . Merchants within the
heart of the Quarter (i.e., along Bourbon and Royal streets) feared the increasing competition
from businesses along the riverfront. The respo nse of Ron Forman , the executive director of the
Audubon Park Commission, was that "the bigger issue is the survival of the city, not the survival
of some particu lar merchants" (City Business, September 1, 1986, p. 1).
The project was prese nted to the public as a major element in the city's economic
recovery . The $40 million aquarium promised 250 ,000 additional tourists annually (for a total of
860,000 visitors a year), 1,000 jobs (250 permanent jobs and 750 construction jo bs), and an
overall economic input of $53 million a year. The project was financed by a combination of
public and pr ivate funds . Fifteen million dollars came from pr ivate sources , mainly from
riverfro nt developers , oil companies and other corporate sponsors. The chairman of the Business
Council headed the fund-raising committee. The city prov ided $25 million, through bonds
financed by a 3.8 millage increase in property taxes. Charges that the millage is excessive and
will likely create massive patron age -- the 3.8 mills will generate almost double what is needed a
year for debt service, and the term of the millage is almost twice as long as what is needed to
retire the debt serv ice -- were dismissed by the public (City Business, May 25 , 1987, p. 1). The
referendum on the millage increase passed handily , with 70 percent in favor. Blacks, a key to
the success of the refere ndum , turned out to vote on the prom ise that jobs were to be created.
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On the night of the election Barthelemy said the results meant "we' ll get some black folks back to
work" (Times-Picayune , November 5 , 1986, p. 1).
The campa ign organ izers worked hard to gain black support. They made media
presentations to black groups, including over 60 black ministers . They highlighted the aquarium
legislation' s guarantee of minority participation in 20 percent of construction work , 30 percent of
all jobs , and 30 percent of all suppliers. The campaign worked , for black support was higher
than white support, as blacks urgently felt the need for more jobs to be created (Times-Picayune ,
November 6, 1986, p. 7) .
Blacks monitored the aquarium project carefully . A full-time person was hired to assist
minority businesses to bid construction work and to fill job openings. To date , the goals of
minor ity participation have been met. However, in the beginning things did not run smooth ly.
When the director of the APC , Ron Forman , named a three-m ember design team to coord inate
the project, the black community cried out that there were no blacks on the design team. Within
several weeks , two black architectural firms were added to the design team . Roger Ogden , then
chairman of the aquarium oversight committee, called it "an historic moment in the social and
economic structure of our city" (Times-Picayune , February 27, 1987, p. B-2).
In March 1988 the Audubon Park Commission created the Audubon Institute, a pr ivate,
non-profit organization that would hire employees and manage the daily operations of the
aquarium (Times-Picayune, March 22, 1988, p. B-1). The institute is also responsible for
supervisi ng marketing , fund-raising, concess ions, and educational prog rams. The commission
continues to make decis ions related to spending, design and construction , and long-range plans .
The new institute is designed to allow for the hiring of the best-qualified personnel , without the
constrai nts of civil ser vice. Forman said the new structure will allow them to run the aquarium
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like a business rather than in the traditional governme nt manner. The institute is composed of
the present Friends of the Zoo , which handles some management duties and fund-raising at the
Audubon Zoo , and a new group, the Fr iends of the Aquarium. All employees of the APC were
given the option of working directly for the institute or staying under Civil Service; about 80
percent opted for the former , given the promise of higher salaries .
With the development of the new aquarium and the continued enhancement of the
Audubon Zoo, the APC will continue to play a significant role in the growing family-oriented
tour ist industry in New Orleans . The director of the aquarium and the zoo, Ron Forman, has
proven to be a highly successful development entrepreneur. He is credited with having changed
the zoo from a foul-sme lling facility to one of the premier small zoos in the nation. (For a more
detailed discussion of the Zoo , see Whelan and Dupont, 1986.) More than anyone else, he sold
the idea of an aquarium to the New Orleans public. He worked behind the scenes, with "no
formal planning pro cess, " to get the riverfront site at the foot of Canal Street selected for the
aquar ium. That site responded to the needs of riverfro nt developers who needed to tie in the
pedestr ian link between two major riverfront projects. The aquarium project filled their needs
and they in turn became major supporters of the project. Others in the city, especially blacks,
were encourag ed to support the project because of the jo bs pro mised. Along the way, Forman
has become one of the foremost developme nt entrepreneurs in the city.
As the example of the aquarium project showed , consensus seeking para-apparatuses, in
this case quasi-public development organizations, are extremely important actors in the New
Orleans regime. In particular , some of the more autonomous agencies have emerged as activists
in the would-be corporate regime. Leading development actors have developed autonomous
power bases .
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By looking at New Orleans over the past 20 years, we have seen that the issue of race
influences the type of regime that is developed . With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, large numbers of blacks became available to be incorporated into an electoral coalition.
Incorporation entailed responding to the needs of the black community , as articulated by the
leaders of the newly formed black political organizations. The needs centered around expanding
services and generating greater resources, needs that were unlikely to be provided by the kind of
caretaker regime that New Orleans had known historically. Thus , with the incorporation of large
numbers of blacks into the electoral arena, the stage was set for the creat ion of a corporate
regime. It is a process that has been developing for the past 20 years , and has seen the election
of two black mayors, both of whom come from Creole backgrounds.
The dilemma facing the emerging governing coalition in New Or leans was how to appear
progressive in addressing the needs of the black community and yet meet the needs of the major
business interests. The solution in New Orleans, as elsewhere , was to stress the creation of jobs
and black business involvement. Start ing with Landrieu, the influx of federal dollars (first anti
poverty dollars and later economic development dollars) made it poss ible for some of the needs
of the black community (or at least those of its leaders) to be met. Both Landrieu and Morial
tried to use the mayor 's office to refashion the city, and both used pro mises of jobs generated by
federally financed programs to garne r black support. By the time Barthelemy was elected mayor ,
federal dollars were no longer available for economic development and the mayor had to rely
even more heavily on private dollars to fuel the economy and, in the process , create the kinds of
resources that could be used to garner black support .
With the changing economic fortunes of the city, the kinds of symbolic overtures to the
black community also changed. During Morial's administration, there was much more emphasis
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on bringing blacks into the mainstream of all facets of society and of making the mayor the
spokesman for the newly incorporated . So sure was Morial of his appea l to the black community
that he was willing (and able) to bypass the black political organization during his first mayoral
campaign. His combative nature in advocating on behalf of their rights brought Morial strong
support from many blacks. Barthelemy's message has been to bring the commu nity together
again, but the emphasis has been on reassuring whites that they still have a major ro le to play in
the development of the city. It was a message that did not play well in the black community
until, in his second mayoral election, he faced a white opponent. Then the black community
rallied to his side in order to be sure of keeping a black person in the mayor's office.
Barthelemy has used his access to patronage to reward blacks, especially the black political
groups, but his symbol ic overtures to blacks have been kept low-key. His overtures have been to
the white corporate comm unity, and he has served to facilitate their vision for the redeve lopment
of the city , not fashion one of his own.
The interracial politics of New Or leans is familiar to most black-majority cities . What is
unique about New Or leans is the intra-racial politics between blacks of a Creole heritage and
those of an Americanized heritage. The two major black polit ical organizations that were started
in the mid-1960s reflected the split: COUP for Creoles, SOUL for other blacks. Land rieu had to
be careful to compensate each group equally for its support, and thus as resources started flowing
into the black community, they were fractured along ethnic lines. Th is bifurcation within the
political arena is also reflected within the social arena, and thus the black community comes
together in reaction to events, such as a white candidate running against a black one (as with
Morial in the 1977 and 1982 and Barthelemy in 1990) , but not in being as proactive to events
around them as they might be. For instance , when Jefferson (with SOUL's backing) ran against
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Barthelemy (with COUP's backing) in 1986 , there was no black group to suggest that they not
run against each other, for each was representing a different part of the community. Resources
are thus diluted and blacks find it that much hard er to speak with a united voice to the governing
coalition.

Conclusion: Toward A Theoretically Reconstructed Urban Regime Theory

A theoretically reconstructed urb an regime theory must begin by interpreting the specifics
of urban regimes in the context of higher- level theoretical abstractions. In our case, we find
Clark and Dear's (1984) abstractions focusing on the state apparat us particularly useful, for they
prov ide for insightful interpretation without a priori determinism. The state apparatus refers to a
complex of mechanisms through which state power is exercised .

According to Clark and Dear

(1984:43) , the operationalized objectives of the state are: 1) to secure social conse nsus; 2) to
secure the cond itions of production; and 3) to secure social integration, especially of the
subordinate classes. They develop a taxonomy of the state apparatus based on sub-apparatuses
determined by the "collection of agencies, organ izations, and institutions which constitute the
means by which (specific) state functions are attained " (1984:49). They locate the local state
(govern ing coalition) as part of the consensus seeking political sub-apparatus of the state. The
problem with this conceptua lization is that while it allows for connections at the abstract level, it
is not usefu l in making the sought-after but elusive connections between higher-level abstractions
and empirical reality (see Lauria, 1985 for a critical review of this interpretive framewo rk) . On
the one hand, contrary to Cox (1991a,b), this is precise ly where we find the "new urban politics"
literature so useful. But at the same time, we agree with Cox that this literature suffers from not
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making explicit connections to the higher-level abstractions found in the "political economy of
the state" literature.
As stated in the introd uction, we see as a telling weakness in Stone's urban regime
typology its undertheorization in terms of the relatio nships between the stru cture of the electoral
coalition, the stru cture of the governing coalition (both public and private), and the stabi lity of
the regime. Th is is part icular ly apparent since regime theory has yet to specify the ro le of racial
politics in governing coalitions that maintain urban reg imes." Th is is not a minor omission, for
the black electorate will have an increasing ro le in urban politics for the expected future. Our
case study is illustrative. At different times, New Orleans has seemed to be each of the three
regime types delineated by Stone. Certainly, through much of its history, New Or leans politics
were dominated by a caretaker regime. 10 The period from the 1930s to 1970 can be broadly
characterized as a caretaker regime, with the exception of a brief reformist thrus t in the early
years of the Morrison administration (the late 1940s) (see Harris , 1974) .
Occasionally , there has been some evidence of prog ressive forces in New Or leans. Most
notably, this happened when preservationists and neighborhood groups banded together to stop
the construction of the Riverfront Expressway in the 1960s. Although to some degree , the early
years of the Morial administration can be viewed as a prog ressive reg ime, the 1970s and early
1980s saw a differe nt sort of regi me emerging. The reigning electora l coal ition during the
Landrieu and Morial administration was that of the overwhelming majority of black voters , and a
minority of wh ite voters . The ironic aspect of the black electorate is that it has a tendency to
support either a progressive regime or a corporate regime: a caretaker reg ime is very difficu lt to
maintain in a city with a recent majority black electorate. The progress ive regime histor ically
courted the black elector ate symbolically, ideologically, and through redistributive policies.
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Given the intensification of the fiscal crisis of the state, the prospects of jobs and minor ity
contracts within a pro-growth strategy have become more seductive. This changing structure of
the electorate and changing political patro nage system helped pave the way for the emergence of
a corporate regime. Ultimately, mayors Landrieu and Mor ial pursued policies which also headed
the city towards a corporate regime. Following Reed (1988), "really existing" black urban
governments adhere to a corporatist/pro-growth framework for the same reasons that whitedominated ones have. Accord ing to Reed,
it seems reasonable and proper ideologically, confor ms to a familiar sense of
rationality , and pro mises to deliver practical, empirical benefits. ...the interests to
which the reg ime is most attentive are included among the framework' s
beneficiaries... .They are by and large only black versions of the prog rowth
regi mes that they have replaced , distinguished in part by the asymmetry of their
campaign rhetor ic and their practice of governance. They are in one sense even
more attractive as j unior members in the progro wth coalition because of their
peculiar skill at derailing opposition to development initiatives and cultivating the
loyalty or acquiescence of the growth machine' s victims (1988).
The election of Sidney Barthelemy in 1986 brought a different political coalition to City
Hall. Barthelemy was elected by a minority of black voters , and an overwhelming majority of
white voters. By and large, this electoral coalition is reminiscent of the caretaker regime of
earlier years. Many of his white supporters may have wanted low taxes and low levels of
government activity. But the low level of activity at City Hall opened the door for the growing
corpo rate leadership and the development entrepre neurs to play a more explicit role in
strengthening a pro-growth coalition. Since blacks were mainly concerned with the rewards of
city government -- patro nage positions, contracts, etc. -- they were co-opted into becoming
willing participants in the elector al coalition through Barthe lemy 's adroit handling of their
concerns. By the time of his re-election in 1990 (against a white oppo nent), Barthelemy won with
86 percent of the black vote and 23 percent of the white vote (see Whe lan and Young, 1992, p. 142).
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Urban reg ime theory , and typologies in general, are by their conception static and thus
not helpful in explicating transitions within the larger schema, or in our case the emergence of
new regime. It is our contention that for a corporate regime to emerge (either from a progressive
or caretaker one), it must rely on the development of consensus seeking para-apparatuses
concerned with economic development to gain political strength. In recent years, business
dominated gro ups (especially the Business Council) have tried to transfor m the New Orleans
governi ng coalition into a vigorous corporate regime. The creation of the Business Counci l and
its offshoot, the Council for Fiscal Reform (see Miron , 1992), marks a transformation in the role
of large mobile capital in the New Orleans governing coalition. The first two chairmen of the
Business Counci l are major corporate CEOs. The Business Council has been aided in its efforts
by several dynamic development entrepreneurs in quasi-public agencies with some autonomy,
who share its aims.
The leaders of these consensus seeking para-apparatuses all exemplify innovative
development entrepreneurs. Like their counterparts in other communities (Times-Picayune, July
15 , 1987, p. 1; Times-Picayune, May 18, 1986, p. A-1) they are activists who would like to see
a corporate regime dominate in New Orleans. They want the kinds of achievements in tourism,
the port , and economic development that other communities have demonstrated.
In contrast, the heads of the city's functional bureaucracies have not shown the same kind
of entrepreneur ial leadersh ip. By and large, in a time of fiscal scarcity, the heads of city
departments have been reactive. In considering the land use alliance, it is noteworthy that the
City Planning Commission has been rather compliant in recent years on development issues (see
case studies in Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Doig, 1987; and Caro, 1974 for counter examp les).
On a number of controversial matters (e.g ., the siting of the new aquarium on the French Quarter
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waterfront, expans ion on the French Quarter riverfront), the commiss ion has sided with
developers instead of env ironmentalists and preservationists who opposed the scope of the site of
the development. 11
The new business leadership coalition dovetails well with Barthelemy's vision of the role
of city government. Although Barthelemy believes that economic deve lopment planning and
initiatives shou ld come from the private sector, a problem arises when public action is necessary
to support private development. This is especially the case when the approval of voters is
required. Then the active involvement of the political leader is needed in order to galvanize the
voters throu gh promises of benefits to come. In the process , the governing regime moves toward
a more corporate orientation.
In conclusion, what have we added to urban regime theory? First we have embedded it,
for interpretation and specification purposes, within the framework of higher-level abstractions
concerning the form, function , and mechanisms of the state in a capitalist social formation. This
aided us in explicating the emergence of a corporate regime in New Orleans. It helped us
unders tand the ro le of quasi-public development agencies as consensus seeking para-apparatuses
of the newly emerging corpo rate governi ng coalition.

At the same time, it highl ights the

political role, in contrast to the more explicit economic role, these organ izations have within the
new regime. Second , we have argued that the changing structure of an electoral coalition has
much to say about the likely stability of a governing regime. In our case, we focused on racial
politics and the develo pment of a majority black electo rate. While we argue that the complexity
of racial politics in New Orleans leads to perp lexing political coalitions based on specific heritage
and class, we also argue that it is difficult for a caretaker regime to maintain the support of a
black electorate. Given the historical legacy of the black population in the United States in
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general and New Orleans in particu lar , the overwhelming majority of the black population are
low-income renters. This is not likely to be a stable political base of a caretaker regime. While
it can be the political base of a progressive regime, and was in many urban areas during the
influx of federal dollars, given the fiscal crisis of the state at all levels of government , it is more
likely that the black electorate can be seduced with promises of trickle-down jobs fostered by a
corporate-led pro-growth coalition. At the same time, such a governi ng coalition is politically
and economically attractive to the small but influential black middle class. This is what we see
happening in New Or leans in the 1990s.
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Endnotes

1.

This is not a criticism; Cox has been active in these debates and has researched at the nexus
of the new urban politics and locality studies (see Cox and Mair 1988, 1989a,b). It is
interesting to note that the new locality and regional focus in geography and the new urban
politics in political science were generated, at least explicitly, in reaction to what some
believe to have been a scientific imperial threat from economics represented by the rise of
political economic perspectives in both disciplines (from both Marxian and/or Chicago
School roots). There are countless examples of disciplinary scholars in essence pro claiming
that "see we are an important discipline; politics (or read geography) matters."

2.

From their rejoinders , it appears that Stone (1991) and Fainstein (1991) agree with Cox on
this point; where they appear to disagree is with his real ist epistemology (after Sayer , 1984)
and Marxian rooted theoretical predisposition represented here.

3.

During Landrieu ' s term in office , a number of political offices were won by blacks, all of
whom were Landrieu allies and their victor ies were a direct resu lt of his back ing. In 1972
Robe rt Collins became the first black federal judge in the "Deep South" Eastern District.
In 1973 , Edwin Lombard was elected Clerk of Court, the first black parochial (parish-wide)
official since Reconstruction. In 1974 Sidney Barthelemy became the first black state senator
elected in a century. In 1976 Rev. A.L. Davis became the first black city councilman when
the other councilmen at Landrieu 's urging named him to an unexpired term. The next year ,
Sidney Barthelemy became the first black city councilman-at-Iarge. James Singleton beat
Davis for a seat as a district councilman.

4.

The seven-member City Council did not become majority black until 1985, when Babovich
was forced to res ign and Ulysses Williams was named in his place. In 1986 the Council had
an elected black majo rity .

5.

During Morial's admini stration , from the time the execut ive orders on set-asides went into
effect in Septembe r 1984 to April 1986, the amount of contracts awarded to minorities
include: construction, $13.4 million; personal and professional serv ices, $1.6 million ; and
set-asides, $2.1 million (Rice, 1986). During Barthelemy's term, from April 1986 to
September 1988, the amount of contracts awarded to minorities include: construction $31
million; professional services , $20 million, and set-asides , $16.5 million (Office of Minority
Business Deve lopment City of New Orleans) .

6.

Jefferson ran in 1982 because he felt that Mor ial was vulnerabl e in both the black and white
communities. There was a large pocket of black dissatisfact ion, expecially following the
killing of three blacks by police officers in the Algiers neighborhood, and the fact that black
political organizations felt that they were being ignored by Morial (Jefferson had strong ties
with the leaders of SOUL). Therefore, Jefferson calculated that he could get a significant
amount of the black vote. Jefferson also felt he could get white support, since he had won
a large number of white votes in his successful campaign against a 16-year incumbent for his
Senate seat. Jeffe rson 's calculations may have been naive to begin with , assuming he could
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beat the city ' s first black mayor. However, when Ron Faucheaux, a white candidate, entered
the race, Jeffe rson's strategy went awry . The blacks stayed with Morial, to make sure that
Faucheaux did not win, and the whites went with Faucheaux. Jefferson lost with only 7
percent of the vote.
7.

With 5 1.2 percent of the electorate black, the results of the 1986 mayor al election suggest
that the white vote played the same role that the black vote played in the 1960s and 1970s,
when it was the minor ity component of the electorate. Black voter turnout was relatively low
in 1986. When blacks are faced with two viable candidates, they often turn out in lower
numbers, since some refuse to choose between the two.

8.

A federal audit of the airport 's contracts completed in May 1989 was critical of the non
competitive process used by the Aviation Board in awarding professional services contracts.
These contracts, worth millions of dollars annually , tend to go to friends and political
supporters of Barthe lemy and city council members (Times-Picayune , May 5, 1989, p.B-3).

9.

Interestingly and fortu nately, Stone 's failure to theorize racial politics is not reflected in his
insightful analysis (see his analysis of Atlanta's urban regime in Stone, 1989:183-199).

10.

In an earlier paper on development policies in New Or leans, Whelan (1987) employed the
regime concept. During the years from the second World War until 1970, New Orleans
politics followed Elkin's characte rization of a "pr ivatist regime." The city became involved
in numerous feder al programs, and blacks attained significant employment in city government
for the first time (See Perry and Stokes , 1987). The Morial administration (1978-1986)
seems somewhat akin to Elkin's description of a "federalist regime." The city achieved
substantial resu lts in economic development by employing federal monies. At the same time,
the city became increasi ngly dependent on the federal government. Blacks became the
dominant partner in the electoral coalition. In the earlier paper (wr itten at the start of the
Barthelemy administration), the years after 1986 were called a "post-federalism regi me." In
a review of this paper John Kincaid notes that these regimes are all keyed to mayoral
elections. Kincaid also observes that there is not "clear specification of criteria for
demarcating regimes" (Kincaid, 1988). Whelan would not use these categor ies now,
preferr ing Stone's typo logy or corpo rate, progressive , and caretaker.

11.

The head of the City Planning Commission resigned in 1988 to take a position with the
Audubon Institute. The City Planning Commission is now headed by a black for the first
time in its history .
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